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ABSTRACT
               During the first half of the nineteenth century the United States emerged as a major
producer of cotton textiles. This paper argues that the expansion of domestic textile production is
best understood as a path-dependent process that was initiated by the protection provided by the
Embargo Act of 1807 and the War of 1812. This initial period of protection ended abruptly in 1815
with the conclusion of the war and the resumption of British imports, but the political climate had
been irreversibly changed by the temporary expansion of the industry. After 1815 nascent
manufacturers sought to protect the investments they had made by lobbying Congress. Their efforts
had an important impact on the provisions concerning cotton textiles in the tariff bill of 1816, and
during the 1820s manufacturers won increasingly strong protection, culminating in the passage of
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  At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the United States was a minor 
contributor to world production of cotton textiles.   Yet by mid-century the United States 
was the world’s second largest producer of textiles.
1 The rapid take-off in American 
textile production is summarized in Table 1, which shows numbers of spindles in the 
United States and Britain in the century after 1790.  With the growth of textile 
production, the United States also developed an active community of textile machinery 
producers who became a source of important innovations in both factory spinning and 
weaving technologies.  In particular, Americans were the leading innovators in the 
development of ring spinning techniques, while British machinery producers 
concentrated on advancing mule spinning.  During the second half of the nineteenth 
century American advances in ring spinning made their way back across the Atlantic, as 
British machinery producers began to borrow from Americans.
2 
  The rapid growth of the American textile industry during the nineteenth century 
was an important component of the broader process of American industrialization. Cotton 
textile factories were the single largest employer of manufacturing labor and textile 
machinery producers made important contributions to the production of steam engines, 
locomotives, and other industrial machinery.  The concentration of textile producers in 
the New England region for most of the nineteenth century magnified their impact on the 
regional economy.  Because of the geographic concentration of textile production, New 
England industrialized much more rapidly than did the rest of the country.  By 1880, 
close to 40 percent of New England workers were employed in manufacturing, and of 
these 37 percent were employed in the production of textiles.  In other words,    2 
approximately one of every six workers in New England was engaged in textile 
production. 
  Viewed from the perspective of the early nineteenth century it was not at all 
obvious that the United States would emerge as an important producer of cotton textiles. 
Population and markets were small and widely scattered, capital was expensive, and 
skilled textile workers were in scarce supply.
3  That the industry would become localized 
in New England would also have been difficult to predict at this time.  Although some 
accounts have emphasized water power as a potential source of locational advantage, this 
explanation does not stand up to careful examination. There were in fact many 
comparable water power sites in the Mid Atlantic region, and in the Piedmont areas 
further South.
4  Moreover, according to Albert Bolles, writing toward the end of the 
nineteenth century, the region’s natural endowment was if anything unconducive to 
textile manufacturing.  
The climate was dry and cold, entailing a large expense in warming and steaming 
the air of the mills…The factories were situated many hundreds of miles away 
from the cotton growing regions, entailing another large expense…[And] the 
waterpower of the South was as abundant and cheap too, as that of the North.
5 
While purely locational factors do not help to explain New England’s leadership in textile 
production, a more persuasive case can be made for the role of labor supply conditions.
6  
Nonetheless, labor supply appears to have been more important in allowing the industry 
to expand after its initial establishment than in influencing entrepreneurial decisions 
about where to locate factories.
7    3 
  In light of the importance of cotton textiles in both national and regional 
economic development it is important to understand how and why the U.S. industry 
developed when and where it did.  As befits a topic of this importance the history of New 
England textile production has been documented in considerable detail.
8  My purpose 
here is to offer a new interpretation of these facts.  In this chapter I argue that the 
development of the American cotton textile industry, and its localization in New England 
can best be understood as a path-dependent process in which transitory historical 
“accidents” altered the course of development producing effects long after the conditions 
to which they gave rise had disappeared.
9   
  Specifically, I argue that the protection provided by the Embargo Act of 1807 and 
the War of 1812 led to the initial expansion of textile manufacturing in the United States.  
This transitory period of protection ended abruptly in 1815 with the conclusion of the war 
and the resumption of British imports.  But the political climate had been irreversibly 
changed by the temporary expansion of textile manufacturing.  Nascent manufacturers for 
the first time sought to influence tariff policy. Their lobbying had an important impact on 
the provisions concerning cotton textiles in the tariff bill of 1816, and during the 1820s 
manufacturers won increasingly strong protection, culminating in the passage of the 
“Tariff of Abominations” in 1828.  In particular, the 1816 bill incorporated a provision 
specifying a minimum valuation for textiles that created substantially greater protection 
for the less expensive and coarser fabric produced by the newly established Boston 
Manufacturing Company.  This protection was important in providing the company the 
time it needed to perfect the novel system of production—relying on the power loom and 
vertically integrated production—that it had introduced, and initiating the process of    4 
technological innovation that led to rapidly falling costs.  Although the focus of my 
account is on the relationship between the temporary episode of protection after 1807 and 
the development of the power loom, this was not the only channel through which path 
dependence operated.  The impact of the early industry’s development on the formation 
of an industrial labor force, and the creation of a community of engineers and mechanics 
familiar with the construction and maintenance of textile machinery provided additional 
sources of irreversibility that helped to promote the growth of the industry once it had 
been established.  
  There is, of course, a large literature devoted to the question of whether protective 
tariffs were important in the development of the American textile industry.
10  But most of 
this literature has focused its attention on the question of whether the higher rates enacted 
in the 1820s were essential.  Given the limitations of the data, this question is unlikely 
ever to be resolved to the full satisfaction of all participants, but it is my contention that it 
was the earlier period of protection that preceded the tariff that was crucial in setting the 
stage for subsequent growth, and indeed in influencing legislative actions that resulted in 
protection, whether necessary or not.  In the absence of these events, the course of 
American economic development could well have been substantially different. 
 
The Early Development of the American Textile Industry 
  Before 1807 the scarcity of skilled labor and capital in conjunction with small and 
diffuse markets for yarn and cloth discouraged the growth of textile production in 
America.  Americans were well informed about British innovations in textile technology 
and there had been a number of successful efforts to recruit British artisans with the    5 
knowledge to build and operate machinery based on these innovations.  Yet, the 
American industry remained small in size and limited in scope.  In 1807, there were still 
just 8,000 spindles in operation in America, a miniscule figure when set against the 
millions of spindles in Britain at this time. 
  The small size of the American industry reflects its competitive disadvantages in 
this era, not a lack of information about British technology.  Knowledge of British 
innovations in spinning crossed the Atlantic quite rapidly.  Within 5 years of Hargreave’s 
1770 patent on the spinning jenny, for example, two 24-spindle jennies were in operation 
in Philadelphia, one having been built for a immigrant weaver, and the other constructed 
by a local craftsman.
11  Although the jenny multiplied yarn output, it still relied on skilled 
labor for its operation, and the shortage of such skilled labor was apparently a significant 
obstacle to its widespread adoption in the United States.  Despite the efforts of various 
groups throughout the Northeast to promote domestic textile manufacturing, capacity 
expanded only slowly.  By 1790 there were still fewer than 10 textile manufactories in 
the United States operating less than 2,000 jenny spindles. 
  Typical of these efforts was the Beverly Cotton Manufactory, which was formed 
by a group of Massachusetts merchants in 1787.  The founders hired an English emigrant 
weaver, Thomas Somers, to supervise operations, and equipped the company with an 
Arkwright roller card, four jennies, a twisting mill, a warping mill, and fly shuttle looms.  
Despite attracting the attention of many visitors, the company was unable to turn a profit 
even though it was exempted from taxation, and subsidized by the state legislature.  
Confronted with continuing losses it shut its doors within a few years.
12     6 
  While hand powered jennies offered little advantage to American producers, other 
British spinning technologies appeared more promising for American circumstances.  In 
particular, Arkwright’s waterframe provided a route to powered spinning of strong but 
coarse cotton yarn that largely dispensed with the need for skilled operatives to tend the 
machinery. Construction of the machines required specialized knowledge, and mill 
management similarly required a degree of skill and experience, but the machinery itself 
could be operated almost entirely by young children.
13   
   Because of British prohibitions on the export of textile machinery, and the 
absence of written documentation describing the design and operation of Arkwright’s 
invention, however, the only way to for prospective American producers to obtain this 
new technology was to recruit British artisans with the requisite knowledge to reproduce 
the machines.
14  By the late 1780s there were a number of Americans seeking to recruit 
such skilled British workers.  Among them was a pair of Providence, Rhode Island 
merchants, William Almy and Moses Brown, who were at this time experimenting with a 
diverse array of manufacturing activities, including operating a stocking frame, spinning 
wool, and using a fly-shuttle equipped loom to weave cloth.  Almy and Brown were also 
spinning cotton on hand jennies and having it woven on linen warp, and they had 
purchased several machines based on Arkwright’s designs, but had been largely 
unsuccessful in getting them to work.
15  In 1789, however, they obtained the services of 
Samuel Slater, a British immigrant with direct knowledge of Arkwright’s technology.  In 
partnership with Almy and Brown, Slater set about construction of the first water 
powered spinning mill in the United States.    7 
  In contrast to other textile ventures at this time Almy and Brown’s partnership 
with Slater proved successful enough to warrant a gradual expansion.  While continuing 
his partnership with Almy and Brown, Slater soon established his own spinning factory, 
and over the next decade and a half small spinning mills proliferated in southern New 
England, many of them operated by Slater’s relatives and associates and closely 
following the initial model he had laid out.  These mills remained small operations and 
confined their activities to spinning yarn.  The initial operations of picking and beating 
the cotton yarn remained a hand activity performed outside the factory, as did the 
weaving of yarn into cloth.   
  Despite the limited success of Almy, Brown and Slater, it is clear that domestic 
producers faced stiff competition from Britain.  Indeed, with the outbreak of war in 
Europe in 1793, British producers sought to expand their export markets in North 
America to compensate for the loss of continental outlets for their production.  Reflecting 
these efforts, between 1793 and 1807, British exports to North America grew from £1.6 
million to £10.2 million, accounting for more than 30 percent of total exports in most 
years during this period.
16  While figures for both domestic production and imports are 
somewhat problematic, Douglas A. Irwin and Peter Temin estimated that total value of 
cloth produced in New England in 1807 was only about 8 percent of the value of cloth 
imported from Britain.
17 
  The modest growth of American factory production of textiles relied largely on 
the waterframe.
18  In contrast, mule spinning, which was much more prominent in 
Britain, made limited progress in the United States.  Like the spinning wheel and jenny 
(and unlike the waterframe) the mule relied on intermittent spinning in which yarn was    8 
first drawn out and twisted, and was then spun onto the spindle.  Unlike the waterframe, 
the mule required adult operatives with considerable skill and hand-eye coordination, but 
it allowed for the production of finer yarns, and made it possible to utilize shorter-staple 
cottons than were possible with the waterframe.
19  By 1790, British factories had nearly 
700,000 mule spindles in operation compared to just 310,000 waterframe spindles.  
While both numbers continued to grow, the number of mule spindles grew more quickly, 
reflecting the advantages in the British context of the mule’s greater versatility in 
producing a range of different yarns along with the more abundant supply of skilled mule 
spinners.
20  
  The passage of the Embargo Act, which took effect in December 1807, effectively 
blocking trade with Europe caused a dramatic shift in the fortunes of domestic 
manufacturing in the United States.  The Embargo created in effect nearly complete 
protection for domestic producers while substantially contracting export markets for raw 
cotton and thus lowering the price of this crucial input.  Although the longer-run effect of 
the embargo was to stimulate production, the immediate effect was a sharp reduction in 
demand for American yarn.  Almy and Brown’s chief markets were in New England, and 
the merchants upon whom they relied to distribute yarn were hit hard by the collapse of 
trade caused by the embargo.  Nonetheless, the embargo created new opportunities that 
soon buoyed production.
21   
  The growing population in the trans-Allegheny west had until now been supplied 
largely with fabrics imported by Philadelphia and Baltimore merchants.  Faced with the 
cessation of these imports, merchants in these Mid-Atlantic cities turned to the New 
England mills.  Prior to the embargo, more than half of Almy and Brown’s sales had been    9 
to merchants in Boston and other northern New England cities.  In 1808, however, this 
share fell to just 17 percent, while Philadelphia and Baltimore together accounted for 44 
percent of their sales, up from 24 percent in 1806.
22 
  The cessation of trade caused by the Embargo Act, and the subsequent disruptions 
due to the Non-intercourse Act and the open hostilities with Britain that began in 1812 
made domestic production much more profitable than it had previously been.  As Figure 
1 illustrates, while the prices of cloth rose, the cost of raw cotton was falling after 1808. 
The partial resumption of trade after the repeal of the Embargo Act caused cloth prices to 
fall in 1810 and 1811, but the outbreak of war with Britain in 1812 caused the gap 
between input and output prices to widen further.  In this period, falling raw materials 
costs in combination with rising product prices suddenly made textile manufacturing a 
much more attractive opportunity, especially for merchants whose capital was now 
released from international trade. Figure 2 makes clear just how abrupt the response to 
the shift in business opportunities was.  From 1800 through 1807, just 5 textile 
manufacturing firms were incorporated in New England and the Mid Atlantic states.  In 
1809, 18 new companies were incorporated.  Another 17 were formed in 1810, and the 
number of incorporations continued to increase thereafter, reaching a peak of 105 in 
1814.  The resulting growth in domestic manufactures is also apparent in the industry’s 
consumption of cotton.  Between 1800 and 1805, the growth of domestic cloth 
production had doubled consumption of cotton from 500 to 1,000 bales.  In the next five 
years cotton consumption increased ten-fold, and by 1815 it had grown to 90,000 bales.
23  
Peace and the resumption of British imports brought this period of expansion to an abrupt 
end, a fact clearly reflected in the sharp drop in factory incorporations after 1814.    10 
 
The Origins of the Massachusetts System 
  The growth of domestic textile production in the United States after 1807 was 
based almost entirely on supplying the growing demand for cloth, not yarn.  To meet this 
demand the Slater-style mills of southern New England were obliged to find weavers to 
convert their factory spun yarn into fabric.  They did this through a proliferation of 
arrangements with individual weavers.  But this situation proved highly unsatisfactory for 
a number of reasons.  The supply of weavers in proximity to the spinning mills was 
quickly exhausted, making it necessary to contract over increasingly long distances.  
Many of the weavers Slater dealt with, for example, were more than 20 miles away.  
Moreover, individual weavers proved unreliable, and the quality of their work varied 
substantially.  Almy and Brown expressed their frustration in securing regular deliveries 
from outworkers in an 1809 letter, observing that “we have several hundred pieces now 
out weaving…but a hundred looms in families will not weave as much cloth as ten at 
least constant workmen.”  The next year they abandoned outwork entirely, setting up a 
group of hand weavers in their workshop and instructing their superintendent to spin only 
as much yarn as these weavers could convert into cloth.
24 
  The scarcity of hand weavers was thus a significant bottleneck to the growth of 
the American textile industry.  Seeking to overcome this obstacle a number of 
manufacturers and mechanics sought to develop a power loom.  British innovators had 
been working on developing power looms as well, but the much more abundant supply of 
skilled hand weavers must have made the need for such an innovation far less pressing.
25  
Among the Americans interested in power weaving was Francis Lowell, a Boston    11 
merchant.  Lowell had spent several years in Scotland, and had made careful observations 
of British textile technologies during his time abroad.  Now he drew on this knowledge to 
develop plans for a power loom.  In 1813, during the wartime boom in domestic textile 
production, Lowell in combination with a small group of Boston businessmen established 
the Boston Manufacturing Company, with the goal of spinning and weaving cotton cloth 
in a single integrated factory.
26  Working with a skilled mechanic, Paul Moody, he was 
able to construct a satisfactory loom, and the Boston Manufacturing Company produced 
its first cloth in 1815. 
  In contrast to American borrowing of spinning technology, the development of 
power weaving proceeded more or less in parallel in the United States and Britain, and 
Lowell’s solution to the problem of power weaving was rather different from British 
efforts.  From the outset, Lowell’s goal was to weave a single, uniform product.  As 
Nathan Appleton, one of Lowell’s associates in the formation of the Boston 
Manufacturing Company recalled: “The article first made at Waltham, was precisely the 
article of which a large portion of the manufacture of this country has continued to 
consist; a heavy sheeting of No. 14 yarn, 37 inches wide, 44 picks to the inch, and 
weighing something less than three yards to the pound.”   This was a plain, coarsely 
woven, but durable fabric that Lowell intended to compete primarily with the “yard wide 
goods of India” that had heretofore supplied the country.
 27 
  By dispensing with the need for flexibility, and concentrating on weaving coarse 
yarn, Lowell was able to substantially simplify the mechanical problem of building his 
loom. In particular, because the coarser yarn that Lowell planned to use would be able to 
withstand relatively greater stresses than finer yarns, he was able to dispense with the    12 
need for a variable speed batten and the complex gearing that that implied.  There is little 
evidence to document the evolution of Lowell’s thinking at this time, so it is difficult to 
say if he was remarkably prescient in adapting the Boston Manufacturing Company’s 
production process to America conditions, or if he was simply lucky.  But in either event 
the system that emerged was remarkably well suited to the factor proportions and product 
markets that confronted American producers at this time.  Using coarse yarn spun on 
waterframes to weave a coarse but durable fabric, Lowell was able to substitute higher 
quality raw materials and special purpose machinery for relatively scarce skilled labor, 
while meeting a growing domestic market.
28 
  Developing a power loom was essential to overcoming the shortage of hand 
weavers in the United States, but the decision of Lowell and his associates to embed the 
use of the loom in an integrated textile factory was arguably as important in terms of its 
influence on the industry’s subsequent development.  From the outset, Lowell envisioned 
the Boston Manufacturing Company as encompassing the entire range of production 
activities involved in converting raw cotton into cloth.  In particular this meant that 
spinning and weaving operations could be closely matched to each other, ensuring that 
yarn suitable for the power looms was produced in the appropriate quantity, and that 
there would be a use for all of the yarn that was spun by the factory.  This close 
integration, in conjunction with the decision to produce a single uniform type of fabric 
also reduced the need for flexibility in production. 
  Although the technologies adopted by the Boston Manufacturing Company did 
not require craft skills, they nonetheless placed substantial demands on existing sources 
of labor supply.  The scale of the company’s operations required a much larger labor    13 
force than existing spinning mills had needed, and the physical demands of operating the 
equipment meant that the bulk of this labor had to be performed by adults.  An adequate 
supply of labor was not to be found at the factory site.  To meet its labor needs the 
company was obliged to innovate by recruiting young women from rural areas of New 
England and providing suitable housing for them near the factory.
29  That there was a 
large pool of potential labor in the countryside to be recruited facilitated the industry’s 
subsequent expansion, but there is little indication that this realization had much impact 
on the company’s initial choice of location.
30    
  While Lowell and his associates focused on mechanizing and speeding up the 
production of a small range of fabrics by substituting special purpose machinery for 
skilled labor, British inventors devoted considerable attention to the development of 
machinery that could be adapted to produce a broad range of different yarns and fabrics.  
In doing so, the machinery they devised continued to rely much more heavily on the more 
abundant supplies of skilled mule spinners available in Britain.  Such a strategy was 
essential in the vertically disintegrated British industry, where spinning mills had to be 
able to adapt to the shifting demands of weavers.  It also reflected the larger market for 
high quality products that British manufacturers supplied.
31  Britain’s continued reliance 
on mule spinning reinforced the divergence of the two national systems because the 
primary route into the ranks of skilled mule spinners was through informal apprenticeship 
as a piecer.
32  Thus an important by-product of reliance on mules was the production of 
the next generation of mule spinners. 
   Beyond reducing demand for skilled mule spinners and hand weavers, the Boston 
Manufacturing Company’s decision to integrate production served to focus innovation on    14 
bottlenecks in the production process.  Realizing the benefits of the new power looms, for 
example, required improvements in the process of warping and dressing.  After the 
introduction of the power loom, Moody turned his attention to improving existing 
techniques for winding and dressing the warp yarns for power looms.  By altering the 
position of the warping beams and adding drying fans he was able to speed the process of 
dressing the yarn, while the introduction of stop action devices that would detect breaks 
in the yarn allowed warping to be carried out more rapidly.  Because of the stresses it 
placed on the yarn the Waltham loom also required yarns with a relatively high twist.  
Imparting this twist meant that spindles had to turn more slowly, and increased the 
number of spindles necessary to supply each loom.  This trade-off encouraged American 
innovators to search for ways to increase the speed at which yarn could be spun.  At the 
same time that integration focused attention on bottlenecks slowing production, it also 
created opportunities for cost savings.   A good example of this is provided by Moody’s 
development of a filling frame that used bobbins that could be used in powered looms, 
thus avoiding a separate step to wind the yarn onto the bobbins.
33  
  The Boston Manufacturing Company commenced production in January 1815, 
and by 1816 the initial plant, equipped with 2,000 spindles, was in full operation.  By 
early 1818 a second mill was under construction.  During these early years Moody 
continued to refine existing machinery, and develop new equipment.  By about 1820 
Moody had completed the basic set of machinery on which the Waltham system rested, 
but the rapid pace of advance in total factor productivity throughout the 1820s and 1830s 
suggests that learning-by-doing continued to create substantial opportunities for 
incremental improvement in the production process.
34   By 1820 the company had    15 
exhausted the available water power sources in Waltham, and many of the original 
investors along with a few new ones began to explore new sites for future expansion, 
settling eventually on what would become the town of Lowell.  In December 1821 this 
group established the Merrimack Company to construct a factory at this site.  Over the 
next decade the same close knit group of investors founded additional companies as 
demand for their product continued to grow rapidly.
35 
  While the textile industry in Massachusetts grew through the multiplication of 
factories based on the underlying technology developed by Lowell and Moody at the 
Boston Manufacturing Company, textile firms in Rhode Island followed a different path 
of development.  For a number of years, these firms continued to rely on hand weaving to 
produce finer and more complex fabrics, such as checks and plaids, which could not be 
produced on power looms.  But competition from imported cloth imposed significant 
pressures on these companies, and most went out of business.  The resulting decline in 
demand for hand weavers helped to reduce hand weaving rates, however, making it 
possible for the survivors to hold out for quite a while.  Slater, for example, did not 
abandon hand weaving until 1827.  Thus, there was a gradual convergence toward 
integrated production and power looms throughout New England, but the route followed 
by the Rhode Island producers was rather different from their neighbors to the North.
36   
  In contrast to the technological convergence of the industry in New England, 
producers in Philadelphia continued to rely more on hand weaving, producing finer and 
more varied goods, and seeking to adjust production to changes in market demand.
37  The 
Philadelphia producers struggled, however, in the face of import competition, and they 
remained a relatively small part of the American industry.  In 1831, Pennsylvania    16 
produced just 10 percent of the nation’s cloth, while New England accounted for 71 
percent.
38   
 
Tariff Protection and Path Dependence 
  The protection from foreign competition afforded the American textile industry 
after 1807 was instrumental in the rapid expansion of capacity, and encouraged the 
emergence of a uniquely American set of production technologies promoted by Francis 
Lowell and embodied in the Boston Manufacturing Company.  The argument for path 
dependence hinges, however, on making the case that this initial “historical accident” 
altered the course of the industry’s subsequent development.  One important and 
irreversible consequence of the industry’s growth in this period was a change in the 
political environment in which subsequent discussions of tariff policy took place.  In this 
context Congress adopted in 1816 a tariff bill that provided an important degree of 
protection for the industry, preventing a return to the pre-war status quo and providing 
Lowell and Moody with the opportunity to work out the details of the Boston 
Manufacturing Company’s production process. 
  Following the ratification of the Treaty of Ghent in February 1815 the country 
was flooded with imports.  During the year ending September 30, 1814 total imports were 
valued at just $12.97 million.  In the following year this figure increased almost nine-
fold, to $113 million.  In 1816 the value of imports increased again, reaching $147 
million.
39   Among these imports were large quantities of yarn and cloth offered at low 
prices. Confronted with this competition, America producers substantially scaled back 
production.  Douglass A. Irwin and Peter Temin estimate that the value of imported    17 
British cloth rose from zero in 1814 to $21 million in 1815.  Because of the long voyages 
involved, Indian and Chinese imports did not increase until 1816, but then their value 
shot up as well.  Under pressure from these imports, the value of cloth production in New 
England fell from $47,160 in 1815 to just $16,355 in 1816.
40   
  The effect of renewed competition was devastating for American textile 
producers.  In June 1816, Nathan Appleton accompanied Lowell on a tour of a number of 
Rhode Island mills, finding production at a standstill: 
We proceeded to Pawtucket.  We called on Mr. Wilkinson, the maker of 
machinery.  He took us into his establishment—a large one; all was silent, not a 
wheel in motion, not a man to be seen.  He informed us that there was not a 
spindle running in Pawtucket, except a few in Slater’s old mill, making yarns.  All 
was dead and still…We saw several manufacturers; they were all sad and 
despairing.
41 
Without additional protection it appears that conditions would have returned to 
something like the situation that prevailed before 1807.  Recognizing this, many of the 
new manufacturers turned to Congress in hopes of rescuing their investments. 
  The temporary increase in duties passed at the outset of the War of 1812 was 
slated to end one year after conclusion of the peace treaty.  Consequently early in 1816 
Congress took up the question of establishing new duties.  Reporting on the subject, the 
Committee on Commerce and Manufactures explicitly noted the difficulties of cotton 
manufacturers, and the numerous petitions that had been received from them advocating 
greater tariff protection.  Citing the perilous condition of these manufacturers, the 
committee went on to note that passage of a protective tariff would put the manufacturers    18 
“…again into operation with increased powers; but should it be withheld they will be 
prostrated….A capital of near sixty millions of dollars will become inactive, the greater 
part of which will be a dead loss to the manufacturers.”
42 
  Textile manufacturers efforts to influence tariff legislation extended beyond 
petitioning Congress for support.  It is apparent from the records of the subsequent debate 
in Congress that for the first time a number of manufacturers were present in Washington 
during discussion of the tariff bill, and that members of Congress consulted with them to 
ascertain the effects of potential legislation.
43  Prominent among those manufacturers 
seeking to influence the tariff was Francis Lowell, who was instrumental in shaping an 
important piece of the resulting legislation: the provision in the bill that established a 
minimum valuation for cotton cloth imports of 25 cents per square yard. As a result of 
this provision cloth valued at its place of export at less than 25 cents per yard was taxed 
as if its value was 25 cents.  Such a provision fell heavily on the Indian textiles that 
Lowell envisioned as the primary competition for the Boston Manufacturing Company’s 
product.  Since these fabrics cost only about 8 or 9 cents per yard in India, the minimum 
effectively increased their price by over 80 percent.
44 
  Lowell’s position was at odds with most of the other producers, and the more 
moderate position that he adopted on the tariff rate won the support of a number of key 
southern representatives.  Describing the situation, Appleton wrote: “The Rhode Island 
manufacturers were clamorous for a very high specific duty,” but Mr. Lowell’s “views on 
the tariff were much more moderate, and he finally brought Mr. Lowndes and Mr. 
Calhoun [both of South Carolina], to support the minimum…”
45  By focusing on the 
minimum clause rather than a high overall rate, Lowell had found a way to circumvent    19 
important sectional conflicts on trade, and win the backing necessary to gain protection 
that he believed his company needed.  Because Indian textiles did not use American 
cotton, it was possible for at least some influential southern Congressmen to support the 
minimum clause, which effectively excluded Asian cloth, while continuing their 
opposition to high overall tariff rates, which would threaten the British manufacturers 
who were the main consumers of America cotton.
46  
  The importance of Lowell’s strategy, and the effect of his effort to win southern 
support for the minimum is apparent in the two key votes on the tariff bill, which are 
compared in Table 2.  In the first vote, the House by a large majority voted to reduce the 
proposed tariff on textiles from 30 percent in the first 2 years to 25 percent for two years, 
followed by a 20 percent rate in subsequent years.  As Table 2 makes clear, the majority 
of support for the higher rate came from the Mid Atlantic and Midwest.  Votes from the 
New England delegates—reflecting the region’s strong mercantile interests—were nearly 
2-to-1 for the lower rate, Rhode Island’s representatives did vote in favor of the higher 
rate.  As expected, the South was strongly against higher tariffs, voting nearly 5-to-1 to 
lower the rate. A few days later the House turned to the question of the minimum, 
rejecting a proposal to eliminate this provision.  Once again, the Mid Atlantic and 
Midwestern representatives voted strongly in favor of protection.  Although 
representatives from the southern states still voted against the tariff bill, the margin 
narrowed considerably, with delegates from South Carolina—one of the major cotton 
growing states—now voting 6-to-3 in favor of the minimum.  In New England, as well, 
the pattern of voting shifted notably.  In contrast to the earlier vote, New England 
legislators voted strongly in favor of the minimum.  Interestingly, a large number of the    20 
representatives from Massachusetts ducked this vote and were not recorded, possibly 
reflecting an effort on their part to avoid offending either the state’s mercantile and 
nascent manufacturing interests. 
  By advocating the minimum provision Lowell had succeeded in finding a 
workable political compromise that provided the Boston Manufacturing Company with 
considerable protection from its chief competition: low-priced Indian textiles.  The 
minimum was in effect essentially a prohibitory rate.  As the Boston merchant Henry Lee 
wrote after passage of the minimum: “We have given up the Calcutta trade, except for 
raw cotton, Manufactures will not do—The Duty on coarse Cloths under new Tariff is 
from 60 to 70 % …”
47  In the wake of its adoption the value of imports from India fell by 
nearly two-thirds between 1816 and 1817.
48   
  The tariff of 1816 provided some protection for other producers as well, reducing 
the flow of British imports.  But the postwar slump, foreign competition and the collapse 
of western currencies greatly strained many of the more traditional textile firms in Rhode 
Island and around Philadelphia, whose products competed more directly with those of 
British manufacturers.  Many went out of business, and others substantially scaled back 
production.  One of the clearest signs of contraction is the declining demand for hand 
weavers, who saw piece rates fall from a third to a half between 1816 and 1820 as they 
were squeezed between the lower cost of machine woven plain cloth and the low prices 
of imported fancy goods from Britain.
49  
  The continued depression of traditional textile manufacturers in Philadelphia was 
clearly captured in data collected for the census of 1820.   At the firm of Craige, Holmes 
& Co., which had begun production in 1809, the number of outwork weavers fell from a    21 
peak of 300 during the war to only 150 by 1820.  Other manufacturers had also 
contracted production substantially.  Table 3 documents the dramatic decline in 
employment.  Overall textile employment in Philadelphia fell by almost 85 percent from 
its peak in 1816 to its trough in 1819, with yarn production and cotton weaving being hit 
much harder than wool or other products such as hosiery and rugs.  Even by 1820, as 
employment had begun to bounce back, employment was still only about 30 percent of its 
1816 level.
50   
  In contrast to the depressed conditions of Rhode Island and Philadelphia textile 
firms, the Boston Manufacturing Company was expanding rapidly at this time.  Sales 
increased from $412 in 1815 to $23,628 in 1816, and had reached $260,658 by 1820 
despite declining cloth prices.
51   
  Was the protection provided by the tariff of 1816 essential to the Boston 
Manufacturing Company’s success in this period?   The evidence on this point is 
circumstantial, but suggestive. First, it is evident that in 1816 Lowell believed that this 
protection was vital.  His presence in Washington during the Congressional discussion of 
the tariff, and the efforts he devoted to insuring the passage of the minimum clause 
provide some indication of the importance he placed on this measure.  But it is also 
important to keep the chronology of events in mind.  The Boston Manufacturing 
Company had only begun production in early 1815, just as the Peace Treaty was 
concluded, and the volume of its production and sales in that year was miniscule.  Paul 
Moody had worked out solutions to a number of the technological challenges of 
integrated production by 1816, but it was not until 1820 that he had developed versions of 
all of the machinery that would comprise the Waltham system.  And the sustained    22 
improvements in productivity over the next two decades point to the considerable room 
for additional improvement that remained at this point.  As a result it is easy to imagine 
that there must have been considerable uncertainty about the company’s prospects at this 
time.  Supporting this view Figure 3 compares the prices of Waltham cloth, with that of 
Russian Brown sheeting.  In 1815, Waltham produced cloth was nearly 20 percent higher 
in price than its competitor.  But by 1819, this gap in prices had been eliminated and 
thereafter prices of the two fabrics followed a comparable downward trend.  In view of 
these facts, there is good reason to believe that without the minimum the Boston 
Manufacturing Company’s investors would have been reluctant to make the additional 
investments in perfecting the company’s technology and expanding its capacity.  And 
without these investments the American industry would have developed much more 
slowly, if at all.
52 
  During the 1820s the effective level of tariff protection for the American industry 
increased substantially.  Even without additional Congressional action, falling textile 
prices driven by sustained technological improvements in efficiency would have 
increased the range of fabrics to which the minimum valuation applied.  But in 1824 
Congress raised the minimum valuation to 30 cents per yard, and in 1828 increased it 
again to 35 cents.  By 1830, Douglas Irwin and Peter Temin have calculated that the 
average ad valorem tariff on British textile imports amounted to over 40 percent.  With 
falling prices, the effective tariff continued to increase, reaching a peak of nearly 50 
percent in the early 1840s before being dramatically scaled back in the tariff bill of 
1846.
53  There is, however, little evidence that the Massachusetts textile firms viewed this 
additional protection as necessary for their survival, and they did not lobby for these    23 
increases.  Increased protection, however, may have been more important in sustaining 
the smaller and less mechanized branches of the industry in Philadelphia and Rhode 
Island. 
  While the additional protections enacted after 1816 may have been unnecessary 
from the perspective of the Boston Manufacturing Company, some level of tariff 
protection appears to have been important for an extended period of time.  Determining 
when the American industry could have competed without protection is controversial and 
unlikely to be completely resolved given the limitations of the data.  F.W. Taussig 
contended that by 1833 the period of the American industry’s infancy had come to an 
end, and that tariff protection was no longer necessary.
54  More recently, however, Mark 
Bils and C. Knick Harley have argued that had tariffs been eliminated at this time a large 
part of the American industry would have been driven from the market by competition 
from British imports.
55  Drawing on comparisons of the prices of similar British and 
American products, which are available from the early 1840s, Harley concluded that 
throughout the 1840s and 1850s American prices would have been above the prices of 
British cloth plus the costs of trans-Atlantic shipping.  While the pre-1846 tariffs were so 
high as to be redundant, Harley showed that even after 1846, the more limited tariffs still 
in effect were enough to offset British cost advantages.  This conclusion is supported by 
the fact that American cloth was largely uncompetitive with British cloth in third 
markets, such as Canada, where the two products competed on an equal footing. 
Recently, Douglas A. Irwin and Peter Temin have challenged Harley’s interpretation.  
based on econometric analysis of the relationship between the relative price of imported 
cloth and domestic cloth production.
56  Irwin and Temin found that domestic production    24 
was insensitive to variation in the price of imported British cloth (incorporating the 
effects of the tariff), which they interpreted as evidence that the two products were 
sufficiently differentiated that they did not compete directly.  The difficulty with this 
interpretation is that given the apparent redundancy of the rates that prevailed from the 
early 1830s through 1846 there is no reason to expect that marginal variations in tariff 
rates would have any impact on the volume of domestic production.  Although this 
objection does not apply to the post-1846 period, there was no variation in tariff rates 
after this date, and British export prices changed little in this period, so it is hardly 
surprising and not terribly informative that their regression fails to find a relationship 
between import price movements and domestic cloth production.  That American 
production did not fall after 1846, does suggests that American producers could by this 
date hold their own against international competition with a minimum of protection.  But 
dating the transition more precisely is nearly impossible given the types of evidence 
available.   
  Regardless of how early the Boston Manufacturing Company could have survived 
in the absence of tariff protection, the disproportionate protection that the minimum 
valuation clause provided for the coarse machine-made cloth that it produced 
undoubtedly accelerated the American industry’s transition to vertical integration and 
power weaving based on the Waltham model.  This in turn created a pronounced 
divergence between the British and American industries that is clearly apparent by the 
1830s.  Fabrics differ in a variety of dimensions, the most important of which are the 
count—or fineness of the yarn—and the complexity of the weave.  While complexity 
cannot be measured, data allow us to get a sense of the count produced in each country.     25 
As Peter Temin has documented, by the early 1830s American and British manufacturers 
were producing almost entirely different products.
57  An 1833 survey of Lancashire firms, 
for example, found that counts varied from 8 to 180, with the average being around 51.  
In contrast, the Massachusetts textile firms concentrated in coarser fabrics with counts in 
the low 20s.  In New York, the only state for which a distribution of counts is available 
80% of the cloth produced had counts of under 21 (in comparison just 9% of Lancashire 
fabric in 1833 was below 21).  Indirect evidence for other states based on the average 
weight per yard suggests an average count in most states of around 20.  Only 
Pennsylvania appears to have diverged from this pattern. 
  Associated with these different products were very different technological 
paradigms.  British technological innovation focused on increasing the versatility of 
machinery to allow shifts in count and fineness in response to shifting market 
opportunities.  Thus considerable effort was devoted to developing a fully automated 
mule, perfecting looms that could be adapted to producing different weaves of cloth, and 
roving machines that could produce a wide range of rovings.  In contrast, American 
innovations focused primarily on reducing capital and labor costs by increasing the speed 
with which standard counts of yarn and standardized fabrics could be produced.  By mid-
century American advances in continuous spinning had proceeded far enough that they 
began to be re-imported by British textile machine makers.  
 
Conclusion 
  By the mid-nineteenth century, America had emerged as the second largest 
producer of textiles in the world, and while American manufacturers were not    26 
competitive in export markets with British manufacturers, they dominated their own large 
domestic market and had developed a distinctive and eventually highly influential mass 
production technology that was substantially different from the more vertically 
disintegrated and craft-based production system in Britain.  At the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, this situation would have been viewed as highly improbable.  
Explaining how the American textile industry overcame its initial disadvantages is central 
to our understanding of the larger course of American economic development. 
   It has been my contention that the development of the American textile industry 
hinged on a series of historical “accidents.” The growth of the American industry was 
initiated in 1808 by the high level of protection afforded in the years between 1808 and 
1815 by the Embargo and Non-intercourse Acts, and the War of 1812.  With the return of 
peace in 1815, the situation could easily have reverted to something close to the pre-war 
status quo.  Cheap imported cloth flooded domestic markets and caused many 
manufacturers to abandon production.  But the substantial investments made in 
manufacturing plant, and the large number of manufacturers shifted the political debate 
and led to the passage of tariff laws that provided protection to at least one branch of the 
domestic industry, that based on factory production of cloth.  This protection, in turn, 
provided the inducements necessary to develop and perfect this technology.   
  Tariff protection was, of course, inefficient in terms of static resource allocation.  
Had tariff rates been set at a lower level in 1816, American consumers would have been 
able to purchase more cotton cloth at lower prices.  But this static inefficiency was 
important in encouraging dynamic gains in efficiency through technological innovations 
pursued by American producers.  The essence of the infant industry argument is that the    27 
long-run gains from these advances outweighed the initial costs of the tariff.  How one 
judges the trade-off between costs and benefits hinges on the question of how quickly 
American producers became able to compete in world markets without tariff protection.   
  Beyond the effects of tariff protection in creating the circumstances in which 
American textile producers could develop and perfect their own distinctive technology 
there are other, perhaps even more significant spillovers, though their effects are hard to 
quantify within the framework of efficiency.  One of these spillovers operated through 
the development of the American machine tool industry and the development of an 
indigenous community of engineers.  Along with small arms producers, textile machine 
shops were the major source of skilled mechanics who contributed to the emergence of a 
distinctive American machine building industry in the nineteenth century.   A second set 
of spillovers operated through labor markets.  During the 1840s New England textile 
mills emerged as important magnets for Irish immigrants.  In their absence, Irish 
immigration to the United States might have been slower, with important implications for 
sectional politics in the 1840s and 1850s.  Constructing a full blown counterfactual 
account of American economic development in the absence of the tariff is beyond the 
scope of this essay, but Australia—a rich, growing economy, reliant primarily on 
agricultural production and dependent on trade to meet its needs for manufactured 
goods—offers a vision of one potential alternative path.    28 
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Cotton Textile Capacity in The United States and Britain, 1790-1895 
 
  Thousands of Spindles  Ratio 
Date  United States  Great Britain  (U.S./Great Britain) 
1790 2  2,410  0.001 
1805 5     
1809 8     
1812 93  5,850  0.016 
1817 333  7,850  0.042 
1832 2,800  9,000  0.311 
1845 7,500  17,500  0.429 
1850 9,600  21,000  0.457 
1861 10,000  30,300  0.330 
1875 19,500  37,500  0.520 
1880 20,805  39,750  0.523 
1885 22,750  43,000  0.529 
1890 25,460  43,750  0.582 
1895 28,200  45,400  0.621 
 
Sources: David J. Jeremy, Transatlantic Industrial Revolution: The Diffusion of Textile 
Technologies Between Britain and America, 1790-1830s (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), 
91; F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New York and London: G. P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1931), 28;  D. A. Farnie, The English Cotton Industry and the World 
Market, 1815-1896 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 180. 
 Table 2: 
 
Voting on Selected Amendments to the Tariff Bill of 1816 
 
 
  To Reduce Tariff on Cotton Textiles from 
30 percent to 25 percent in first 2 years 
  To Eliminate the Minimum 
Clause 
State and Region  Against  For    Against  For 
New England  12  21    18  9 
 Connecticut  2  4    2  3 
 Massachusetts  6  7    8  1 
 New Hampshire  0  6    2  3 
 Rhode Island  2  0    2  0 
 Vermont  2  4    4  2 
          
Mid Atlantic  34  9    43  4 
 New Jersey  4  0    5  0 
 New York  16  4    21  1 
 Pennsylvania  14  5    17  3 
          
Midwest 3  0    3  0 
 Ohio  3  0    3  0 
          
South 11  53    18  42 
 Delaware  0  1    0  0 
 Maryland  0  8    2  4 
 Virginia  2  17    4  14 
 North Carolina  0  9    0  11 
 South Carolina  2  7    6  3 
 Georgia  0  6    0  5 
 Kentucky  5  2    6  2 
 Tennessee  2  2    0  2 
 Louisiana  0  0    0  1 
 Mississippi  0  1    0  0 
          
Total 60  83    82  60 
 
Source: Annals of Congress of the United States, Fourteenth Congress, First Session 
(Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1854), 1314, 1348-49.  These counts are based on the 
information on roll call votes on these issues.  The totals do not always accord with the 
summary figures reported in the source.  The reason for the discrepancy is not known.   Table 3: 
 





(spinning yarn)  Wool  Other
a Total 
Number 
1814 1,761  444  1,310  146  3,661 
1816 2,325  191  1,226 78  3,820 
1819 149  20  260  54  483 
1820 671  92  334  42  1,139 
Index (1814=100) 
1814 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
1816 132.03  43.02 93.59  53.42  104.34 
1819 8.46  4.50  19.85  36.99  13.19 
1820 38.10  20.72  25.50  28.77  31.11 
 
 
Source: Philip Scranton, Proprietary Capitalism: The Textile Manufacture at 
Philadelphia, 1800-1885 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 121. 
 
a This category comprises employment in hosiery, floor cloth (carpets) and other textile 
employment. 
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i
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r
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r
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;
 
U
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,
 
C
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n
s
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s
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r
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s
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c
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t
i
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e
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i
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